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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
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which

The rule of

*..tory appeals is rule 5; and

permission to proceed with this appeal has been previously granted
by this Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows:
(a)

Whether the Utah Highway Patrol Officer who stopped
Defendants on Interstate 15 in Juab County had
reasonable suspicion to believe the Defendants had
committed a crime, and thus whether the traffic
stop was proper.
The Findings of Fact in such
cases will not be disturbed unless those findings
were "clearly erroneous". The Conclusions of Law
made by the court, after examining the facts, are
reviewed "under a correctness standard." See State
v. Lopezr 831 P. 2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992) For
further discussion of the standard of review in
this case, see Point I of this brief.

(b)

Whether the Utah Highway Patrol Officer who stopped
Defendants
was
justified
in
detaining
them
subsequent to the initial stop and investigating
matters not related to that stop. See paragraph
(a) above for discussion of the standard of review.

(c)

Whether any consent for a search of the vehicle Mr.
Ziegleman was driving, given by Mr. Ziegleman, was
tainted by an illegal stop and an illegal seizure;
and therefore whether that consent was a valid and
voluntary consent to search.
See paragraph (a)
above for discussion of the standard of review.

(d)

Whether the search of the vehicle driven by Mr.
Ziegleman was a violation of a protected right and
a reasonable expectation of privacy in Defendants.
See paragraph (a) above for discussion of the
standard of review.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
AND REGULATION WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States of
America.
2

[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Amendment XIV § 1 to the Constitution of the United States of
America.
[Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Article I § 14 of the Constitution of Utah:
[Unreasonable
warrant.]

searches

forbidden

—

Issuance

of

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
§ 77-7-15 U.C.A. as amended
Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he
has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his
3

name, address and an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal in a felony criminal matter.
Defendant and Appellant is charged in a criminal Information filed
in the Fourth District Court, Juab County, with a second degree
felony of knowingly
intent

to

Appellant

and

intentionally

distribute, contrary
Brent

Ziegleman,

to

and

possessing

cocaine with

§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
his

Co-Defendant,

U.C.A.
Michael

McNaughton, who has not joined in this interlocutory appeal, filed
motions to suppress evidence, and Appellant filed a Memorandum in
Support of that Motion.

A hearing on the Motion to Suppress

Evidence was held before Hon. George E. Ballif, on November 5,
1991.

By oirder of May 7, 1992, the Motion to Suppress Evidence was

denied.

A Petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal

was filed on May 29, 1992; and an order granting permission to file
the interlocutory appeal was made by this Court on July 1, 1992.
On the morning of July 20, 1991, Trooper Lance Bushnell, of
the Utah Highway Patrol was southbound, just south of Nephi, Juab
County, on Interstate 15 (T.7).

He observed a vehicle traveling

north, across the median, and estimated the speed of the other
vehicle at 75 miles per hour (T.8).

He turned and approached the

vehicle from behind, and found that the vehicle was now traveling
at 60 miles per hour (T.9).

At first he saw one head in the car,
4

and then saw another one come up in the back seat, as if he had
been awakened by the officer's approach•

As he pulled up along

side the vehicle, he intended to give the driver a hand signal to
keep his speed down (T.9).

He did not intend to stop the vehicle,

because he had been unable to pace him and determine for sure that
there had been a speeding violation (T.8-9; 24). The driver and
the passenger, however, stared ahead and would not look at him,
"both consciously trying not to look at me. Almost like they were
guilty" (T.10; 29). The officer, acting on the looks of guilt, and
observing

that both persons

in the vehicle were

"obviously

nervous," initiated a stop. He did not intend to issue a citation;
but did intend to issue a warning and investigate further the
nervousness and "guilty" demeanor (T.31).
Trooper Bushnell asked Mr. Ziegleman, the driver of the
vehicle, for a driver license and vehicle registration.

He was

provided with an insurance paper indicating that the car belonged
to William Kayler, but no registration (T.10-11).

Mr. Ziegleman

gave the name of the owner of the car as "Bill," and said he had
borrowed it for a trip to California and was returning home to
Minnesota.

He didn't seem to remember Bill's last name until he

produced the insurance papers (T.36-37).

Officer Bushnell called

in the car information to his dispatcher to inquire about a
possible stolen vehicle, and received a negative report.
5

The

occupants remained very nervous and overly polite, which
increased his suspicions (T.12-13; 43).

just

Mr. McNaughton was so

nervous that he dropped the contents of his wallet on the ground,
while attempting to look for identification (T.14).

The officer

asked for permission to search the vehicle, after asking if the
vehicle contained drugs, weapons or narcotics

(T.12-13).

The

search request was based primarily on the demeanor of the occupants
and his feeling that "something was going on" (T.40; 53).
The officer started a search of the vehicle, locating first a
package of rolling papers in a tennis shoe in the back seat (T.14).
Neither occupant would admit ownership of the rolling papers, which
seemed odd, because the papers themselves were not illegal.

By

this time officer Bushnell and the Deputy Sheriff who was with him
(but did not testify) had satisfied themselves that they were going
to find evidence of a crime (T.45, 48).

While the search was

conducted, the Defendants "were both really intent on watching the
car" (T.16).

Eventually the officer searched under the hood, and

found a package of cocaine, approximately 1 kilogram in weight,
under an oily rag near the battery (T.16-17).
under

the

hood,

he

was

specifically

looking

When he searched
for

drugs, and

primarily because of body language (specifically, the Defendants
looked away, as he got closer) he was pretty sure of finding some
(T.44-45, 52-53).
6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Officer Bushnell stopped Defendants to investigate what he
felt was suspicious behavior, chiefly consisting of a refusal to
make eye contact, and other signs of what he believed was "nervous"
or "guilty" behavior.

Such a stop was not made with reasonable,

articulable suspicion, and was an invalid stop under the United
States and Utah Constitutions.
Officer Bushnell investigated to see if he could find evidence
of a stolen vehicle, and found none. Nevertheless, he continued to
detain the Defendants, because of their continued suspicious,
nervous and "guilty" behavior. The detention was illegal under the
United States and Utah Constitutions.
Upon making his determination

that

"something was wrong"

Officer Bushnell asked for permission to search the vehicle. While
permission was given by Defendant Brent Ziegleman, that permission
was tainted by the illegal stop and seizure to the degree that,
especially under the Utah Constitution, it was also invalid, and of
no effect.
Defendants were in legitimate control of the motor vehicle,
and no suggestion has ever been made to the contrary.

Therefore,

Defendants did have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and a
recognized right and standing to object to a warrantless search of
their vehicle. Because of the illegalities referred to in previous
7

paragraphs, the objection made by Defendants to use of evidence
illegally seized should be upheld, and that evidence should be
suppressed.
POINT I
THE OFFICER DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE
DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED A CRIME, AND THEREFORE THE
TRAFFIC STOP WAS IMPROPER.
Before discussing the stop of Defendant and Appellant by
Officer Bushnell, it is appropriate here to briefly discuss the
standard of review.

Over the last several years, the Appellate

Courts in the State of Utah have had many occasions to discuss the
standard of review in cases similar to the one at issue here.
Unfortunately, that standard has not appeared to be the same in all
cases.

In fact, this standard in two suppression cases published

in the most recent issue of Utah Advanced Reports seems to vary.
In the case of State v. Sykesr 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App.
1992) the court stated that "a trial court's determination of
reasonable suspicion should not be overturned unless it is clearly
erroneous."

198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. That simple statement was,

however, followed by a lengthy footnote qualifying it.

There was

also a lengthy concurring opinion discussing the standard of review
further.
In a case decided only nine days later, and published at the
same time, this Court quoted the case of State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d
8

1040 (Utah App. 1992) and set forth the standard of review, as
follows:
In examining a denial of a motion to suppress, we review
the trial court's findings of fact "under a 'clearly
erroneous' standard" and the trial court's "ultimate
legal conclusions" based on those findings "under a
'correctness' standard." 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 70.
The exact standard to be applied thus continues to be a little
vague.

It does, however, seem that the court's determination of

facts will be given more deference than the legal conclusions based
upon those facts, which appears to be the traditional rule in Utah
concerning mixed questions of law and fact (See Utah Department of
Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission. 658 P.2d 601
(Utah 1983)).
up

to

the

demonstrate

Regarding the factual issues, it appears that it is

Appellant

to

"marshal

that the evidence

the

evidence"

is insufficient

and

then

to

to support the

finding of the court below, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the decision.

See Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817

P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).

Since this is an interlocutory appeal, and

since the arresting officer was the only person testifying at the
suppression hearing, marshalling
difficult.

the evidence

is not terribly

Concerning the first legal issue, the validity of the

stop, the court entered the following Findings of Fact:
1.

On July 20, 1991 on 1-15 within Juab County, Utah,
Trooper Lance Bushnell, a four year veteran of the
Utah Highway Patrol, observed a motor vehicle in
the area of Nephi, and visually estimated the speed
9

to be in excess of 70 m.p.h., approximately 75
m.p.h., but was unable to obtain a radar reading on
the vehicle. The officer had received training and
certification in estimating of speeds.
2.

The officer turned and followed the vehicle to
obtain a paced speed, but the vehicle had slowed
and was now traveling 60 m.p.h.. He then pulled
alongside the vehicle with the intent of giving the
driver a hand signal to slow down.
Neither the
driver nor the passenger would look towards him so
he could signal them to slow down.
The officer
then stopped the vehicle with the intent of giving
the driver a warning concerning his speeding
(R.97).

The actual testimony given by the officer, under direct and
cross examination, is included in the addendum.

While Defendant

does not dispute the general accuracy of the Court's Findings of
Fact set forth above, Defendant contends that they are superficial.
As sometimes happens with Findings of Fact that are drafted by
adverse counsel, the whole story may not be told.

The court, in

its actual written ruling, added the following comment to its
findings concerning the justification of the initial stop:
It should be noted that if defendants' lack of eye
contact was the cause of the initial stop for speeding,
it was only due to the fact that the officer had been
unable to warn defendant Ziegleman about his excessive
speed by giving hand signals. This behavior did not, in
and of itself, lead the officer to believe that there was
more serious criminal activity going on. Although the
officer considers nervousness and shifty eye movements as
evidence in guilty in certain circumstances, these
behaviorisms in the later part of this investigation only
served to reinforce other feelings as the investigation
continued (R.89).
No statement along this line was contained
10

in the final

Findings of Fact, drafted by counsel for the State.

Defendant did

interpose a written objection, and stated:
At the end of paragraph 2, a comma should be inserted
after the word "speeding" and the following phrase should
be added: "and investigating suspicious behavior of the
occupants, in refusing to look at him" (R.93).
That objection was overruled by the court in a ruling dated
May 13, 1992 (R.102).

The court's Findings of Fact, especially in

its final form, appears to have glossed over, and ignored, the
officer's own testimony.

The officer, admittedly, did not intend

to stop the vehicle at all, until he noticed that defendants would
not look at him.

He had been unable to pace the vehicle, or use

his radar gun to verify a speeding citation, and, according to the
officer:
If I can't confirm a speed, either through pacing or
radar, I wouldn't issue a citation.
I just wouldn't do it. I don't know if the Department
has a policy or not. I'm not going to write a citation
if I can't verify a speed (T.24).
The officer did nothing special (like honking his horn), to
get their attention (T.29).

Instead, he made a determination that

something was going on that should be investigated, despite the
fact that he could certainly not articulate it at the time, and
that the stop was clearly made without reasonable
suspicion.
A.

articulable

In answers to cross-examination, the officer stated:
I do remember they were both — it appeared to me - both consciously trying not to look at me.
11

Almost like they were guilty.
looking straight ahead.

So they were both

Q.

You felt they might be acting as if they were
guilty?

A.

There's no doubt about it. My feeling is they were
just acting guilty. Otherwise the guy in the back
would have still be asleep.

Q.

Officer, I have to ask you: What were they acting
like they were guilty of?

A.

If was obvious they wouldn't look over.
didn't want to look over at me.

Q.

Did they act — Does a drug runner —
Does a
person who's guilty of drug running act a little
different type of guilty than a person who's guilty
of just murdering his wife or just speeding or
something else, or do they all act guilty, in your
opinion?

A.

Well, they act nervous. These two were obviously
nervous, yes, Sir (T.29-30).

They

The officer, in answer to a further question, made it even
more clear why he stopped the Defendants:
Q.

Do you notice any large amount of difference
between people who aref "guilty of something," and
those who aren't and their amount of nervousness?"

A.

Without fail, yes, Sir.

Q.

And in your opinion, that is a good thing to look
for as an estimate that they're guilty of
something?

A.

Probably the best one, yes, sir (T.31).

By refusing to include, in its Findings of Fact, that the
officer had stopped Defendants because of their nervous, suspicious
12

and "guilty" behavior, the trial court made a ruling that was
"clearly

erroneous".

Under whatever

standard

of review is

appropriate, the court's ruling on this point is subject to
reversal. The officer had clearly determined that his visual speed
estimate was not going to be a reason to stop the Defendants or to
give them a citation.

The officer made a determination, after

observing the behavior of the Defendants, that they probably had
committed, or were committing, a crime. He could not say what kind
of crime, but he believed that there was indeed a crime.
The authority of a police officer to stop a person and ask
questions has been codified in Utah in § 77-7-15 U.C.A., set forth
above.

The right to be free from an unreasonable search or

seizure, including the seizure of his person by stopping him and
restraining him from leaving while asking questions is, of course,
based upon the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.

Under the constitutional and statutory

principles recited above, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a
police officer's description of two men seen walking at a late hour
in a neighborhood where a burglary was reported did not provide
other officers with "reasonable suspicion", sufficient to justify
an investigatory stop of Defendant and his companion over two hours
later. See State v. Swaniaan. 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). Likewise,
the Supreme Court ruled that reasonable suspicion was lacking for
13

an investigatory stop of a vehicle with out-of-state plates moving
slowly at 3:00 a.m. through a neighborhood in which a rash of
burglaries had recently occurred, absent an observation of any
criminal or traffic offense and absent burglary reports that
particular evening.
1986).

See State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah

In the case of State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App.

1987) this Court ruled a stop illegal where a police officer simply
became suspicious of three men walking down state street in Salt
Lake City at 3:00 a.m., looking in store windows, and behaving
"suspiciously" when the police officer could not articulate what it
was in particular that aroused his suspicions.
In the case of State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988)
an officer driving on Interstate 15, noticed that what he felt was
unusual and suspicious behavior in the way a driver of another
vehicle held his head and eyes, and used it to stop the vehicle and
search it.

The Sierra court first observed the standards for a

constitutional stop:
Officer Smith's stop of Sierra can be constitutionally
justified on one of two alternative grounds. First, it
could be based on specific, articulable facts which,
together with rational inferences drawn from those facts,
would lead a reasonable person to conclude Sierra had
committed or was about to commit a crime (citations
omitted).
Second, the stop could be incident to a lawful citation
for the traffic violation of driving unlawfully in the
left lane. "Anything less would invite intrusions upon
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
14

substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result [the
United States Supreme Court] has consistently refused to
sanction" (citations omitted). 754 P.2d at 975.
As in the instant case, the behavior of Defendant in refusing
eye contact was the prime reason for the stop in the Sierra case.
The court dismissed that as a proper cause and said:
In making this assessment, the "avoidance of eye contact
can have no weight whatsoever" (citations omitted).
"Reasonable suspicion should not turn on opthalmological
reactions of the appellant" (citations omitted). Id.
The court went on to say:
Applying the foregoing authority to the facts of this
case, the totality of the circumstances confronting
Officer Smith prior to seizing Sierra's car does not
support a reasonable suspicion that Sierra was engaged in
or about to be engaged in criminal activity.
As we have stated, Sierra's failure to make eye contact
with officer Smith is afforded no weight in determining
if he had a reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigatory stop of Sierra (citations omitted). Such
nervous conduct on Sierra's part when confronted by a
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper is consistent with innocent
as well as criminal behavior (citations omitted). Sierra
did not try to evade Officer Smith, nor did he attempt to
conceal anything when pursued by Officer Smith.
We are convinced Officer Smith's decision to investigate
Sierra was based on nothing more than an unconstitutional
"hunch." The fact that his "hunch" proved correct is
"perhaps a tribute to his policeman's intuition, but it
is not sufficient to justify, ex post facto, a seizure
that was not objectively reasonable at its inception."
754 P.2d at 976-7.
As in the instant case, the state argued that the stop was
incident

to

unlawfully

a
in

lawful
the

stop

left

for

lane.

a
The

15

traffic
court

violation,

driving

ruled

it was

that

"impermissible for law enforcement officers to use a misdemeanor
arrest as a pretext to search for evidence of a more serious
crime."

754 P.2d at 977.

In that case, the police officer did at

least have some kind of citation that he could issue.

In the

instant case, it is clear that, while the officer could and did
issue a warning citation because he suspected a possible speeding
violation, he did not have sufficient information to initiate a
traffic stop for speeding.
at all for speeding.
eye contact and the

He did not intend to stop the vehicle

He stopped the vehicle because of the lack of
"suspicious behavior".

In doing

so, he

violated the rights of Defendants under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
As a closing comment on the constitutionality of the stop, the
Sierra Court stated:
We are persuaded that a reasonable officer would not have
stopped Sierra's car and issued the warning citation for
traveling in the left lane but for his desire to
investigate his previously-formed hunch of other criminal
behavior. 754 P.2d at 972.
If a reasonable officer would not have done so in the Sierra
case, a reasonable officer would not do so here.
The findings and decision in the Sierra case are in accord
with several other cases in similar circumstances.

In the case of

State v. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1987) an investigatory stop by
U.S.

Border

Patrol

Officers

operating
16

near

St.

George,

was

invalidated under the following circumstances:
The officers in this case relied on the following facts
in determining that they had a reasonable suspicion
justifying the stop of the Mustang:
(1) the apparent
"Latin descent" of the occupants of the Mustang; (2) the
route of travel; (3) the time of day; (4) the time of
year; (5) the California license plates; (6) the erratic
driving pattern; and (7) the nervous behavior of the
occupants. 748 P.2d at 183.
In addressing the contention that nervous behavior of the
occupants of the vehicle contributed to the stop, the court stated:
The final fact relied upon by the officers was
defendants7 "nervous behavior." When asked to describe
defendants7 behavior more specifically, the officers
merely stated that defendants had a "white-knuckled" or
rigid look and failed to make eye contact. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the failure to
make eye contact can have no weight in determining if the
officers had a reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigatory stop, (citations omitted) 748 P.2d at 184.
In the case of Sandy City v. Thorsness. 778 P. 2d 1011 (Utah
App. 1989) this court found no articulable and reasonable suspicion
when an officer stopped a motorist who had briefly stopped to watch
the

officer

assist

another

motorist,

and

had

failed

to

"immediately" move on when signaled to do so by the officer.
In the case of State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1990)
this court invalidated an investigative stop of someone who had
appeared to avoid a police roadblock.

The court there once again

stated that the stop would only be justified if it was incident to
a traffic offense or based upon a reasonable and

articulable

suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle had committed or were
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about to commit a crime.
In the case of State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) the
court invalidated a stop, on the same stretch of highway involved
in this

case, where

a police

officer

had

followed

a

camper

containing two hispanic occupants, and with California plates. The
stop was made, according to the officer, because, after a period of
following the vehicle, he found that the driver had been following
another vehicle too close.

The court found that the stop was not

made for the stated purpose, but was made for "some unarticulated
suspicion of more serious criminal activity."

796 P.2d at 688.

In the 1991 case of State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213 (Utah App.
1991) this court found no articulable reasonable suspicion to stop
a vehicle driving into a cul-de-sac just before midnight, even
though a search was under way of three houses in the cul-de-sac for
the purpose of locating a methamphetamine lab.
In conclusion, the suspicion

of criminal

activity

by an

officer is not sufficient to stop a motor vehicle to investigate
those suspicions.
articulable.

The suspicion must be reasonable, and must be

Nervous behavior or avoidance of eye contact has

specifically been found by several courts not to be useful in
articulating that reasonable suspicion.
was directly to the point.

The officer's testimony

He had used behavior that to him

denoted "guilt" for a pretext stop, even though the courts have
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ruled that this specific behavior cannot so be used. The stop was
illegal, unconstitutional, and invalid.
POINT II
THE OFFICER WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN DETAINING DEFENDANTS
SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL STOP AND INVESTIGATING MATTERS
NOT RELATED TO THAT STOP.
Once again, the Court made Findings of Fact regarding the
continuing investigation and the detention of the Defendants while
that investigation continued.

Those Findings of Fact are set out

below:
4.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer approached
the driver and asked for a driver's license and
registration.
The driver produced a driver's
license, but was unable to produce a registration.
The driver claimed the owner's name was "Bill" and
he was a friend and he had borrowed the car, but
could give no further information concerning his
name or where he lived. While the driver searched
for the registration, he appeared to be extremely
nervous with the hands trembling. The occupants
had no written authorization or anything that gave
them the right to be in possession of the vehicle.

5.

The officer ran the vehicle through the NCIC
computer to determine if it was reported stolen.
The request came back negative, but the officer
continued to investigate the possibility of a
stolen vehicle, because of his past experience of
finding stolen vehicles not listed on NCIC as
stolen (R.97-98).

The officer approached Mr. Ziegleman, and asked for a driver
license and vehicle registration.
produce

a

driver

license,

but

Mr. Ziegleman was able to
could

not

find

a

vehicle

registration. He indicated that he had borrowed the vehicle for a
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short trip to California, from his friend "Bill" but didn't or
couldn't give a last name. He did, however, produce an insurance
paper with the name William Kayler. The officer's suspicions were
heightened.

He stated, at the suppression hearing:

Well, while he was looking for that, it was quite obvious
he was nervous. His hands were trembling more so than
the general motoring public.
That aroused my suspicion, and the fact he couldn't find
a registration, and the fact that he called him Bill and
couldn't give me a last name of the subject either. I
was suspicious the vehicle was stolen (T.ll).
Regarding Mr. McNaughton, the passenger who was in the back
seat, the officer had this observation concerning his demeanor:
And he quickly came over to that [window], tried to talk
to me through the window. And he quickly rolled the
window down and then he moved back to the other side. He
was obviously nervous. He was doing everything quickly,
abrupt, and trying to answer the questions I had for him.
And he really showed his nervousness there (T.12).
The officer responded to these additional indications of
"guilt" by almost immediately inquiring about what laws they might
have possibly broken:
I just asked several things: If they had any weapons in
the vehicle, any drugs or narcotics, anything to make
them as nervous as they appeared to be (T.12).
The officer also called in the information he had on the motor
vehicle to see if there were any reports of a stolen vehicle. The
report came back negative (T.36).

The officer testified that at

some point he would have had to make a decision as to whether to
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hold the Defendants for further investigation, based upon his
various suspicions, but that he did not have to make that decision.
Based upon head movements, hand movements, and lack of vehicle
registration, the officer decided that "something was going on" and
asked for permission to search the vehicle.

The officer testified

that in far less than half (T.41) of cases in which one person was
driving a vehicle belonging to another, would that person have
written

permission.

The

lack

of

written

permission

was

an

additional pretext to look for further information regarding some
kind of crime, although the officer clearly did not know yet what
kind of crime he was looking for.

The following summary was made

of the officer's testimony, at the end of cross-examination:
Q.

Let me just see if we can get this down to a few
sentences, Officer.
The incident occurred because, number one, you
thought they were speeding and they slowed down;
number two, they wouldn't look at you; number
three, the vehicle belonged to somebody that wasn't
in the vehicle; and number four, body language.
Is that it in a nutshell, or is there anything else
that contributed to the whole incident and your
behavior on that incident?

A.

You could probably put it in those categories, sir
(T.53).

The court, in its written ruling, prior to entering its formal
Findings of Fact, referred to the continuing detention only as
sufficient to check with NCIC to see if the car had been stolen.
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The court found reasonable articulable suspicion that the car might
have been stolen, because of the vague references to "Bill" and the
lack of adequate registration papers in the vehicle.

The Findings

of Fact that the court entered, of course, included the negative
finding on the NCIC check.

The court failed to note, in its

Findings, that the negative check of the NCIC network did not seem
to affect the officer's suspicions at all. The officer had already
decided that "something was going on" and that the nervousness and
body language of the Defendants meant that they were "guilty" of
something.

He simply continued to look for something that they

might have been guilty of doing.

Defendant Ziegleman contends

that, after the testimony of the officer concerning the initial
stop and preliminary investigation, there was still no reasonable
articulable suspicion of anything.

What the officer was doing was

going on a fishing expedition; and the trial court appears to have
been looking for some ground on which to allow him to continue.
The circumstances of the detention of the Defendants in this matter
were almost identical to the circumstances in the case of State v.
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990).

In that case, Defendant

did not attack the actual stop, but did attack the investigatory
detention.

This court, in reviewing the findings of the trial

court, found that the trial court had based its finding of a
reasonable suspicion on the nervousness of Defendant during the
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initial traffic stop, accompanied by "the body language" and lack
of eye contact noted by the officer in the instant case. The trial
court had also noted the failure of Defendants to produce either
written permission from the vehicle owner or a successful means of
contacting the owner during the traffic stop to verify the
permissive use of the van.

The court cited State v. Sierra and

stated:
In part because avoidance of eye contact is consistent
with innocent as well as criminal behavior, Utah
Appellate Courts have previously held that such nervous
conduct can be afforded no weight in determining a
detaining officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. 797 P.2d at 436.
The court went on to discuss the various aspects of the
nervous behavior noted by the officers, and then said:
In the absence of other, objective facts, we decline to
give much weight to an officer's assessment of
"nervousness" due to the subjectivity of that
determination. Id.
In Robinson, the trial court had also noted the absence of
cold weather gear and clothing which might have been used to
substantiate the story of the camping trip towards which Robinson
indicated they were traveling.

After dismissing that finding as

inadequate, the court went on to discuss the detention:
At the time Garcia detained defendants by ordering them
to stand by the van until he returned from conversing
with Ogden, the warning citation had already been given.
The troopers had already obtained valid drivers' licenses
and a valid vehicle registration, as had the detaining
officer in Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519. The troopers knew
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that the vehicle had not been reported as stolen. They
had checked the tendered sources for verifying
defendants7 claim that the van owner had indeed given
them permission to use the van. This checking disclosed
no further information or facts upon which the officers
could base any suspicion that the van had been stolen and
no reason to believe that these potential verification
sources could be pursued again, with success, within a
reasonable time.
Even considering all the circumstances facing the
troopers, the fact the defendants could not — during the
brief time span of the valid traffic stop — produce
either written authorization from the owner or a
successful telephone contact with the owner is
insufficient to provide the officers with reasonable
suspicion of car theft or other serious crime sufficient
to justify the roadside detention and questioning that
followed. Id.
The situation is almost the same here.

The only noticeable

difference is that Mr. Ziegleman produced only an insurance paper,
and not a registration. That difference certainly does not justify
a detention in this case, or the continued investigation.

It is

clear that the officer in this matter was not continuing to pursue
any theory of the car being stolen, after the NCIC check proved
negative. He was simply looking for something, anything at all, to
show some sort of guilt.
articulable suspicion.

That is not reasonable and is not

It appears that the question of fact

addressed by the court will be reviewed under a standard of clear
error. Defendant contends that the findings of the court regarding
the

detention

were

clear

error, especially

when

viewed

in

connection with the court's earlier error regarding the validity of
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the stop.
This court relied extensively on the Robinson case in the more
recent case of State v. Godina-Lunaf 826 P. 2d 652 (Utah App. 1992).
In that case, when the driver, who was not the registered owner of
the vehicle had had no written permission to drive it, was asked
for his driver license and the vehicle registration.

He shook

"just like someone that just wants to please just like I did when
my mom was after me when I got in the cookies when I was eight
years old."

826 P. 2d at 653.

The driver was able to produce a

valid registration, but did not have a driver license. Once again,
an NCIC check for a stolen vehicle was negative.

Once again, the

nervous behavior prompted the deputy to continue asking questions,
and

his

suspicion

was

particularly

aroused

when

the

driver

indicated he had borrowed the car in Salt Lake City to go to
Chicago.

Since the stop was made on 1-70, the deputy tended to

disbelieve that the driver was headed from Salt Lake City to
Chicago.

In the Godina-Luna case, the court ruled that the initial

stop was valid, due to an articulable suspicion of possible drunk
driving.

The

court went

on

to

say, however, regarding

continued seizure and detention:
Once a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred, any
detention for reasons exceeding the scope of the original
stop and not reasonably related to the circumstances
justifying the stop in the first place is illegal,
(citations omitted).
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the

In other words, "the length and scope of the detention
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."
(citations omitted). Once the reasons for the initial
stop have been satisfied, the individual must be allowed
to proceed on his or her way. "Any further temporary
detention for investigative questioning after the
fulfillment of the purpose for the original traffic stop
is justified under the fourth amendment only if the
detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious
criminal activity." (citations omitted).
826 P.2d at
654-5.
The court went on to make the following observation regarding
the success of the officer's continued investigation:
Although the deputy's hunch ultimately proved to be
correct, a hunch, without more, does not raise a
reasonable articulable suspicion regardless of the final
result. 826 P.2d at 655.
In the recent case of United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812
(10th Cir. 1991); Rehearing Denied, 941 F.2d 1086; Cert. Denied 112
S.Ct. 1168 (1992) similar issues arose. Mr. Walker was stopped in
Emery County after being clocked at 67 m.p.h. in a 55 mile per hour
zone.

An NCIC check on a possible stolen vehicle came back

negative.

Defendant was nervous, and his hands shook.

hard time getting his license out of his wallet.

He had a

He told the

officer that the registered owner of the vehicle, Marion Smith, was
his sister, and he was driving her car with her permission.
Nevertheless, based upon the nervousness, the officer continued to
ask questions not concerned with the traffic stop.

Ultimately, he

asked for permission to search the vehicle, which was granted.
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The

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah in its finding that the
detention was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment:
Relying on United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th
Cir. 1988), the district court determined that officer
Graham's continued detention of the defendant in order to
ask him intrusive questions unrelated to the traffic stop
was a violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights. The district court found that the defendant's
nervousness did not create an objectively reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity that would justify the
detention.
The court further indicated that the
defendant had produced sufficient proof showing he was
entitled to operate the car such that no reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity arose from the fact that
the car was not registered to the defendant. 933 F.2d at
814.
The Court stated further:
The officer detained the defendant to ask him questions
unrelated to the speeding infraction or to the
defendant's right to operate the car.
Thus, the
detention was not reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the
first place. As such, it was an unreasonable seizure
under the fourth amendment. 933 F.2d at 816.
The facts of the instant case show no additional reason for
suspicion that was not present in the cases cited.

Certainly, the

officer has utterly and absolutely failed in any of his feeble
attempts to articulate what that suspicion was.

Under even the

most stringent standard of review, the ruling of the district court
fails on this point as well, and this court should rule that the
continuing detention of defendants was an unlawful seizure under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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POINT III
ANY CONSENT GIVEN BY MR. ZIEGLEMAN WAS TAINTED BY AN
ILLEGAL STOP AND AN ILLEGAL SEIZURE, AND WAS NOT A VALID
AND VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO SEARCH.
The Court below, in its Findings of Fact regarding the actual
search of Mr. Ziegleman's vehicle, stated:
6.

The officer then asked the driver if there were any
weapons, drugs or narcotics in the vehicle. The
driver said there was not any. The officer then
asked for consent to search, Mr. Ziegleman
unhesitatingly replied "help yourself".

7.

The officer then searched the interior of the
vehicle and found nothing of substance.
The
officer then asked for consent to search the trunk,
which consent was again given by the driver. Again
no contraband was found therein. The officer then
searched the hood area. Between the right front
fender and the battery was an oil cloth covering a
brown grocery sack with a kilogram of cocaine
contained therein (R.98).

The Findings of Fact adopted by the court did not include the
court's full reasoning, as referred to in the court's written
ruling.

The court stated, in that written ruling:

However, the initial stop was valid, the subsequent
detention was valid, and the contraband was discovered
under the hood of the car pursuant to a valid consent to
a search, and thus it is admissible (R.90).
Obviously, the court relied on a valid stop and a valid
detention.

It has been the position of Appellant in this brief

that the rulings of the court in those regards were in error.

If

those erroneous underpinnings are taken away from the court's
ruling, that ruling concerning

a valid consent no longer has
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support.
Defendant has previously cited, in support of his position,
the Utah case of State v. Sierra.

It is important to note that,

while the bulk of that decision is still good law in the state of
Utah, part of it has been specifically overruled.

The Sierra

decision quoted federal cases, primarily United States v. Carson,
793 F.2d 1141, (10th Cir. 1986) Cert. Denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986)
for the proposition that a consent, even after an illegal stop and
seizure, was reviewed independently for its voluntariness.

That

rule was overruled by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State
v. Arroyo, 796 P. 2d 684 (Utah 1990).
the

burden

of

establishing

a

valid

The Utah Supreme Court put
search

squarely

on

the

prosecution and stated:
When the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent
after an illegal police action (e.g., unlawful arrest or
stop) , the prosecution "has a much heavier burden to
satisfy than when proving consent to search" which does
not follow police misconduct. 796 P.2d at 687-8.
In the Arroyo case, the court had already found the conduct of
the

police

unjustified.

in

stopping

and

detaining

the

defendant

to

The court thereafter set up a new test:

Two factors determine whether consent to a search is
lawfully obtained following initial police misconduct.
The inquiry should focus on whether the consent was
voluntary and whether the consent was obtained by police
exploitation of the prior illegality. Evidence obtained
in searches following police illegality must meet both
tests to be admissible. 796 P.2d at 688.
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be

The

court

first

reviewed

United

States

v.

Carsonf

and

specifically rejected its ruling which made an independent review
of the voluntariness of the consent. The court then reviewed State
v. Sierra which had adopted the Carson rule, and stated:
However, we disagree with the rule established in Sierra
because it fails to give proper weight to Fourth
Amendment values, and we address the issue of the proper
standard to be applied in this jurisdiction under the
second prong of the analysis. 796 P.2d at 689.
The new rule in the State of Utah, as enunciated by the Utah
Supreme Court is as follows:
The basis for the second part of the two-part analysis is
found in the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407,
9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963), which stated that a trial court
must determine in such a case "'Whether granting
establishment of the primary illegality/ the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.'"
371 U.S. at 488, 83 S. Ct. at 417 (quoting
MaGuire, evidence of guilt 221 (1959)). The "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine has been extended to
invalidate consents which, despite being voluntary, are
nonetheless
the
exploitation
of
a prior
police
illegality. 796 P.2d at 690.
The Arroyo case was followed by this court in the recent case
of State v. Godina-Lunar previously cited. Regarding consent, this
court

stated

that

voluntary, and
illegality."

"the

State must

show

the

consent

was

(1)

(2) not obtained by exploitation of the prior

826 P. 2d at 655. The court went on to state that the

Arroyo case "requires that the State 'establish the existence of
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intervening factors which prove that the consent was sufficiently
attenuated from the illegal stop. /n

826 P.2d at 655-6.

Finally,

the court summed it all up thusly:
Here, such intervening factors simply do not exist. The
consent occurred during an ongoing illegal seizure, thus
no time factor separated the illegality from the consent.
Nor were there any intervening circumstances separating
the illegality from the consent. Orozco's invitation to
search was not of itself an intervening circumstance
because the invitation came in response to a question
posed in the midst of an ongoing illegal seizure. 826
P.2d at 656.
The circumstances of the present case are identical.

Once

again, the consent to search was given under circumstances that
cannot be separated from an illegal stop and an illegal detention.
The consent to search was illegally obtained, and the evidence must
be suppressed.
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of State v. Larocco, 794
P. 2d

460

(Utah

1990)

granted

specific

protections

against

unreasonable search and seizure under Article I Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution. Thus, a Defendant in Utah no longer has to rely
exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment and federal case law for
his protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. In that
case, the Supreme Court invalidated a warrantless search even
though the investigating officers had probable cause to suspect
that it was stolen.

The court ruled that the state had failed to

justify a warrantless search by showing either that the procurement
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of a warrant would have

jeopardized the safety of the police

officers or that the evidence was likely to have been lost or
destroyed.

The court then stated:

We now expressly hold the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations
of Article I Section 14. 794 P.2d at 472.
The Utah Supreme Court has had occasion to review its earlier
rulings regarding consent searches and the exclusionary rule in the
recent case of Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission, 198 Utah Adv.
Rep.

5

(Utah

1992).

In that

case, the

Utah

Supreme

Court

invalidated a search made at an illegal police road block, even
though the police had obtained a consent to search at that road
block. The Supreme Court thereafter extended the exclusionary rule
to proceedings brought in front of the Utah State Tax Commission
for failure to affix drug tax stamps.
that, under both the United

The rule is therefore clear

States Constitution

and the Utah

Constitution, the search of a vehicle after an illegal stop and an
illegal detention is in itself illegal, unless there are unusual
circumstances which satisfy the strong burden of proof on the state
to show that the consent was given separately from the stop and the
detention.

It is also clear that, under the United States and Utah

Constitutions, evidence obtained after an illegal search of a
vehicle must be excluded.
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POINT IV
THE ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE MADE BY THE OFFICER DID
VIOLATE A PROTECTED RIGHT AND A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN DEFENDANTS.
The Court's Findings of Fact have been discussed previously.
The Court, however, also made a Conclusion of Law which needs to be
addressed in this brief.

The Conclusion of Law that appears to be

separate from the Findings earlier discussed is Conclusion number
4 and is as follows:
Neither defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
to the hood area of the subject vehicle, and therefore
did not have standing to object to a search of that area
of the vehicle (R.99).
This conclusion was a substantially abbreviated version of
Point Four of the Court's written ruling.

In that ruling, the

court cited the case of State v. Taylor, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 62 for
the

proposition

that

Defendants

did

not

have

a

reasonable

expectation of privacy in the hood area of the motor vehicle which
they were driving.
App. 1991).

That case is now cited as 818 P. 2d 561 (Utah

In the court's written ruling and the conclusion of

law based upon it, the court has made a legal decision as opposed
to a factual one.

This being a legal conclusion, this court

reviews that conclusion under a "correctness standard".

See State

v. Lopezf 831 P. 2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992) and State v. Sepulveda.
198 Utah Adv. Rep. 69 (Utah App. 1992).

The court below, without

discussing State v. Taylor at any great length, decided that the
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hood area of the car in particular could be searched without a
warrant, and without standing to challenge by Defendants, because
Defendants, not being the owners of the vehicle, did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hood area in particular.
Defendant Ziegleman here contends that the court below made an
error of lciw in so reading State v. Taylor.

This court in that

case, specifically discussed whether or not the user of the vehicle
had standing to challenge a warrantless search of a car, even
though he was not the record owner.
subjective

expectation

of

privacy

The court there found that a
was

unreasonable

where

a

defendant could not demonstrate the right to use a vehicle, and
cited the earlier case of State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah
1987) for that proposition. The District Court cited no case law,
and none has been found, for the proposition that parts of the car
can be searched only with permission, and that other parts may be
searched without permission, because those parts are not within a
reasonable expectation of privacy. In fact, since the Taylor case,
this court has reviewed the privacy expectation of a permissive
driver more completely, and found that the reasonable expectation
of privacy does extend to the whole car.
That issue was raised in State v. Robinson, previously cited.
It was disposed of rather quickly in a footnote:
The defendants' testimony that they were given permission
by the owner to take the van on a two-week vacation trip
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was not disputed by the State.
We hold that they
established a possessory interest in the van sufficient
to give them both a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the entire van interior. 797 P.2d at 437 (note 6 ) .
In the more recent case of State v. Sepulvedar also previously
cited, the court first quoted the note set forth above, and then
stated:
In the instant case, Officer Mangelson was the only
witness to testify at the hearing on defendant's motion
to suppress.
Officer Mangelson stated that when he
inquired how defendant obtained possession of the car,
defendant responded "the car belonged to a friend in
California." According to Officer Mangelson, defendant
said he and his passengers had been given permission from
a friend to drive this car to Utah. Officer Mangelson
initially noted the interior of the car was cluttered, as
if defendant and his passengers had been living in the
car.
Therefore, at the time of the search, the facts
established (1) defendant was driving the car, (2)
defendant had permission to use the car, and (3)
defendant had personal belongings in the car.
Following the two-step standard outlined in Taylor, we
first conclude defendants statement that the car belonged
to a friend in California who loaned it to defendant
demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy in the
car. We must next conclude, as a matter of law, whether
the statement manifests an expectation of privacy society
is willing to recognize is legitimate. See Taylor, 818
P.2d at 565. 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 71.
In the cases summarized above, a driver who has permission to
use a vehicle

and has personal

belongings

in the car has a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the car and its contents.

In

contrast to the Defendant in Constantinof Defendant in the present
case told Officer Mangelson he was driving the car with the owner's
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permission.

As in Robinsonf Defendant's statement in Sepulveda

that he borrowed the car he was driving with the owner's permission
was sufficient to confer "a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the entire [car] interior."

Robinson. 797 P.2d at 437 N.6.

Defendant's claim that he had permission to drive the
Camaro was unrefuted, he had personal belongings within
the car's interior, and Officer Mangelson had no
information the car was stolen at the time of the search.
Therefore, we are persuaded defendant demonstrated an
expectation of privacy sufficient to prevent him to
challenge Officer Mangelson's warrantless search of the
car. 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 71.
Once again, the expectation of privacy appears to be in the
entire automobile, once a reasonable expectation of privacy is
established

by some indication that the car is permissively

operated by the defendant. As in the other cases cited, Defendant
stated that he had borrowed the car from a friend and that he did
in fact have authorization to drive it.

As in the other cases,

there was no information known to the officer that the car was
stolen.

In fact, the car has been impounded by the officer, and

has been in possession of the state for many months since Defendant
was stopped.

There has never been any suggestion since that time

that Defendant did not have lawful possession of the automobile;
and certainly the officer never suggested such when he testified at
the hearing.

There is absolutely no legal authority for the

court's suggestion that one part of the car is protected more than
another.

The Taylor case that the court cited did not involve an
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automobile at all.

It involved the searching of a cabin in which

Defendant had previously been a guest on occasion.

The court,

after determining that Defendant had failed to show that he
routinely used the cabin, or he had permission to use it on a
regular

basis,

had

not

demonstrated

a

subjective

privacy

expectation when he was not present during the search, and could
not assert a direct personal right.
As in the Sepulveda case, Defendant had personal items in both
the passenger compartment and trunk of the car.

The passenger

compartment and trunk of the car were searched first, and the hood
area was only searched after everything else.

It was clear that

the officer was continuing to look for something that he expected
to find, first in the passenger compartment, second in the trunk,
and thirdly anywhere else he could think of. The entire search was
one operation; and nobody suggested that the search of the hood
area was somehow separate, and under some separate basis of
authority, from the search of the rest of the vehicle.

The

reasonable expectation of privacy which "arises when defendant is
personally present at or in possession of property with the
authority or permission of the owner" (State v. Taylor, 818 P. 2d at
567) is present in this matter, and this court should correct the
legal error of the court below and find Defendant does in fact have
standing.
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CONCLUSION
Defendants

Brent

Ziegleman

and

Michael

McNaughton

were

illegally stopped by a Highway Patrol Officer on July 20, 1991, and
were illegally held or "seized" by that officer pending an illegal
investigation.

Any search was a "fruit of the poison tree"

resulting from the illegal stop and detention; and Defendants do
now have standing to object to the search. Because the evidence to
be used against Brent Ziegleman by the state was seized as the
result of a string of unlawful proceedings by the Utah Highway
Patrol Officer, use of that evidence must be suppressed; and the
ruling of the court below denying the suppression should be
reversed.
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, 1992.
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. 1992,

I did mail four true and correct copies of the above and foregoing
Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid to R. Paul Van Dam, Utah
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
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MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS
Attorneys for Defendant Ziegleman
930 South State Street, Suite 10
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 224-2119
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF JUAB COUNTY

9

STATE OF UTAH

10

oooOooo

11

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE

Plaintiff,

12
13

vs.

Case No.

14

BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and MICHAEL
McNAUGHTON,

(Judge Ballif)

15
Defendants.

16
oooOooo

17
COMES NOW the Defendant Brent Ziegleman and moves the court

18
for an Order suppressing the use by Plaintiff of any and all

19
evidence obtained as a result of a stop and search of the vehicle

20
Defendant was driving at the time of his arrest.

This Motion is

21
made on the grounds that such stop and search constituted a search

22
and

seizure

pursuant

to

the Utah

State

Constitution

and

the

23
Constitution of the United States, and that it was done without

24
reasonable suspicion as required by said Constitutions and recent

25
case law of the Utah Supreme Court.

26
Defendant Ziegleman requests that an evidentiary hearing be

27
28
luilough, J o n e s ,
& Ivins
i South State St
Suite 10
jm. Utah 84058

1
2
3
4

held on this Motion and that the state be directed to give evidence
5
6

sufficient to constitute a reasonable suspicion for the initial
stop and "seizure11 of Defendant.

7

This Motion will be supported with a Memorandum of Points and
8

Authorities, to be submitted hereafter.
9

DATED this

v

day of September, 1991.

10

MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS
11

CJ^

12

fit

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Defendant, ZiegWman

13
14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

15
16

I hereby certify that on the

4

day of September, 1991, I

17

did mail a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion

18

to Suppress Evidence, postage prepaid, to Donald Eyre, Attorney for

19

Plaintiff, 125 North Main Street, Nephi, Utah 84648 and Milton T.

20

Harmon, Attorney for Defendant, Michael McNaughton, 3 6 South Main,

21

Nephi, Utah 84648.

22

iVfflV fur/'ic

23
24
25 ||
26
27
28
McCuHough. Jones,
& Ivins
930 South State St
Hrom

Suite 10
!Hah A40SR
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particular

area?

A

Y e s , sir, I did.

Q

And have you estimated

speeds and

Dopier radars throughout your career with
Highway

used
the

Patrol?

A

Y e s , sir.

Q

Referring you now to July the 20th of

this y e a r , were you on duty within Juab County
that

on

date?
A

Y e s , sir.

Q

And referring you to the d e f e n d a n t s , M r .

Ziegleman and Mr. McNaughton, seated at

counsel

t a b l e , did you have an occasion to meet those

two

individuals on that date?
A

Y e s , sir, I did.

Q

Where did that take

A

It was on Interstate

That's approximately
Q

place?
15 of milepost

221.

a mile south of N e p h i .

And were they in a motor vehicle that

you

observed?
A

Y e s , sir, they w e r e .

Q

Where were you located when you

observed this motor
A

initially

vehicle?

Initially we were approximately

milepost

two-- it would have been probably 2 1 8 .
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Q

And were you mobile or

stationary?

A

Mobile.

Q

And describe what you observed

on that

occas ion.
A

I was southbound, and the vehicle

were operating was
And while
observed

northbound.

I was driving

at a high

rate

And at the time I was using a radar

that wasn't my radar.
And

southbound, I

this vehicle approaching

of speed.

they

It was one I had

it was a Hawk-- or sorry.

this one's a Speed Gun 8.

borrowed.

Mine's a Hawk, and

And it doesn't

real great mobile radar capabilities.

have

So I wasn't

able to even obtain a speed to that vehicle.
I'd

estimate
Q

But

in excess of 75.

And after you had made an estimate

did

you attempt to obtain a radar reading on it?
A

I attempted

the whole time. But like I

said, that radar doesn't really allow you

that

capabi1ity.
Q

And after you had made that

estimate w h a t - - did you do anything
that

visual
in response

to

observation?
A

Yes.

little w a y s .

I let them go down the road a
And generally

I will

let them go so
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it doesn't appear I'm

going after them until

get further down the road.

And

I pull

into

they
the

median so I can pace them so they don't see me
coming.
In this case it was my opinion they did
me coming.

They slowed down

see

dramatically.

Q

Did you get in behind

them?

A

Y e s , I did. While I was behind

them

speed that I had them at was approximately

the

60

miles-an-hour.
Q

And at that point in time what did you do

A

I pulled along side them.

next?

intentions were

And

I was just going to pull

the
along

side them and give them the finger to slow

down

like that

the

(Indicating.) But I couldn't get

attention of either one of

them.

Initially the only one that was visible
the driver.

And while

I was along side of

the passenger was visible then.
before.

was

them,

He wasn't

Apparently, he had awoken or

something.

Q

He was in the front seat or the

back

A

In the back seat.

Q

Describe the vehicle that they were

seat?
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A

Exact?

It was probably an

a Chevy Caprice.

It was an

and it had Minnesota
Q

' 8 2 , green in color,

that you drove along

them and you attempted

to get their

I would have motioned

but neither one of them would

them to slow d o w n ,
look at m e .

Then what

A

I pulled around and stopped

Q

And upon approaching

A

side

attention?

Q

the driver of the

It was

tags on it.

You indicated

A

' '82.

happened?
the v e h i c l e .

the vehicle who was

vehicle?

Ziegleman.

Mr. Ziegleman, I think

that's

how you say it.
Q

And describe what you did

approaching
A

the

driver?

I just requested

vehicle

information.

a driver's

upon

a driver's

license

And Mr. Ziegleman did

license, but he wasn't able to

any kind of vehicle

And he was able to offer an

paper that had the name William-think

offer

locate

information.

He did say the owner of the car-- the
was Bill.

and

owner

insurance

let's see.

I

I have it here. Insurance paper had a name

of William
Q

Kayler.

But he was not able to produce a
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registration

for the

vehicle?

A

No.

He never did

find one.

Q

Did that raise any concerns

A

Y e s , sir.

Q

What was

A

W e l l , while he was looking

in your

mind?

that?
for t h a t , it

was quite obvious that he was n e r v o u s .

His

hands

were trembling more so than the general

motoring

public.
That aroused my suspicion, and the
couldn't

fact he

find a registration, and the fact that

called him Bill and couldn't give me a last
of the subject either. I was suspicious
vehicle was
Q

he

name

the

stolen.

You indicated

there was a passenger

in

the vehicle.
A

Y e s , sir.

Q

After--

Mr. McNaughton was

in the

rear

seat.

you had stopped

Did you inform M r . Ziegleman

why

him?

A

Y e s , sir.

I would have, y e s , sir.

Q

And after he wasn't able to produce a

registration, what then did you do?
A

I started asking him questions

Where are you going?

Apparently

like:

they were
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back

to Minnesota.
And

he said

I said, " You're going back home?"
" Yes".

" California".

I said, " Where have you

been?"

" What did you do down t h e r e ? "

And at this time M r , McNaughton had
himself

And

in the conversation.

involved

He was sitting

the right rear seat away from m e .

And the

in

rear

window of the left side was rolled down only

three

or four inches.
And he quickly came over to that, tried
talk to me through the window.

And he

to

quickly

rolled the window down and then he moved back
the other side. He was obviously

nervous.

He was

doing everything quickly, abrupt, and trying
answer the questions

I had for him.

showed his nervousness
Q

A

inquiries

of

in the vehicle, any drugs

If they

they appeared

had

or

n a r c o t i c s , anything to make them as nervous

as

to m e .

Q

What was their

response?

A

Driver claimed

he didn't have

of anything

really

time?

I just asked several things:

any weapons

to

there.

Did you make any further

them at that

And he

to

knowledge

of that sort.
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mind

Q

And what then did you

A

I followed

do?

that up and said,

" Do you

if we look?" Deputy Thompkins was riding

me at the time.

And he was on the passenger

with
side

of the vehicle.
Q

That is Deputy Bill Thompkins

Sheriff's
A

the

Department?
Y e s , sir.

And I said, " Do you mind

if we look?"

the driver himself said, " N o , sir.
yourself. "
using

of

And

Help

The driver was very p o l i t e . Always

" Y e s , sir" or " N o , sir".
Q

After Mr. Ziegleman had indicated

that

you could search the v e h i c l e , what then did

you

do?
A

I believe he opened the door and

himself.

I instructed

him to stand behind

out of the lane of traffic.
McNaughton to step out.

removed

And

there so he'd be out of traffic

himself

him to the

back

as w e l l .

And at the same time I asked him what
name w a s , and he just grabbed

car

I asked Mr.

And he removed

from the v e h i c l e , and I motioned

the

his wallet

started digging through his w a l l e t .

And

his

and
I was

watching him as he was going through his w a l l e t .
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He was so nervous.

His hands were going

fast.

And as he was doing that he passed over
appeared

to be his driver's

license, not

o n c e , twice, but a third time.

what

only

I finally

stopped

him and said, "Isn't that it right there?"
And that's when he quickly went
tried to get it out.
the contents
ground.

And when he did that, all

of his wallet had

fallen on the

He was really nervous.

Q

After you had had this conversation

Mr. McNaughton concerning
driver's
A

for it and

his name and

with

the

license, what then did you do?
W e l l , like I say, after Mr. McNaughton

was going through his w a l l e t , I asked him
makes him so nervous.

And he claimed

what

he doesn't

come in contact with the police that much.
Apparently

that's what he was trying to imply

made

him nervous.
So I just started a search of the v e h i c l e .
And

I immediately

rolling papers

located a package of Zig

Zag

in the Nike court shoe in the

back

seat.
Q

I hand you what's been marked

Plaintiff's

as

Exhibit 2.

Have you seen that

before?
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A

Y e s , sir. These are the rolling

papers

that I indicated were in the Court shoe.
Q

Do they have any use in the

substance

controlled

area?

A

Typically they're used to roll

Q

Did you make any inquiries

belonged

marijuana.

as to who

they

to?

A

I asked both of them, and neither one of

them claimed
his shoes
0

it.

However, M r . Ziegleman

later.
What then did you do after you

Zig Zag

claimed

found

the

papers?

A

I continued

the

search.

And

I couldn't understand why neither one of

them would claim the p a p e r s , whereas they're
really illegal to p o s s e s s .

And

I thought

not

that'd

just go along with why they were n e r v o u s .
But I continued to search.

And in the

I just asked them to identify the bag.
driver

identified

" Do you mind
bag.

a duffle bag.

And

And

trunk
the

I asked

him,

if I look in h e r e ? " , indicating

the

And he said, again, "No, sir. Go ahead. "
1 looked

located

in there and there was

in there.

nothing

So I just continued

search, and eventually

I opened

the

that

motor
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compartment underneath the

hood.

And all this time that I was doing
search both subjects wouldn't
of the car.
watching

this

take their eyes

They were both really intent

the car.

on

But as soon as the hood

opened, both of them turned

around and

off

was

looked

away.
Q
you

When you opened the hood area what

did

observe?
A

I was looking

wondering why-that you're

in the hood area

and

Usually when they look away

like

in a warm spot.

I started

looking real close.

And all I

could see was an oily rag between the

right

quarter panel and the battery.

actually

It was

down in the quarter panel behind the m e t a l - they're cutouts-- metal cutouts.
sitting behind that.

And

it was

And the battery was

sitting

next to it.
So eventually
pulled

I worked my way over there

the oily rag off of that.

a brown grocery sack.
that.

And

And

I could

see

I could push down on

And it wasn't an oil can or an oil

container of any sort.
Q

and

Did you then remove

that?
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A
pushed

W e l l , it was in a tight spot.
it back.

packages

It was similar to

And I

cocaine

I had seen before.

Q

It had a shape similar to a kilo of

cocaine

package?

A

Y e s , sir.

Q

From your past training and

have you found controlled

experience

substances-- and

especially with respect to cocaine-- concealed
hood areas

in

before?

A

Y e s , sir, I have.

Q

Did you then remove the item that you

observed?
A

Not right then.

I couldn't--

Like I

said, it was kind of hard to get out of there.
I just pushed

it back to get a good

it w a s , and then we handcuffed
then we went back u p , removed

idea

the s u b j e c t s .
it from where

what
And

it was

at.
Q

You placed them under arrest prior to

removing

it?

A

Yes.

Q

And show you what's being marked

PLaintiff's

Y e s , sir.

Exhibit No. 1, and ask if you

identify the items contained

as
could

therein?

Lesley Nelson, C.S.R.
784 East Skylark Drive
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 (801)

798-2868

28
A

No.

It's better to use--

We're

talking

probably two different things.
Q

Okay.

A

If we're going the opposite w a y ,

radar doesn't allow you that kind of
But once you're behind

this

capability.

it, and as I was pacing

it,

sure, I would have used the speedometer. But I
would verify
Q

it with the radar.

So if--

Let's say you had

sufficient

information to stop and issue a citation.

You

would have done it with your visual e s t i m a t e , your
speedometer

and your radar gun, typically;

correct? All three; is that

correct?

A

In a pacing situation, y e s , sir.

Q

But the second two failed you b e c a u s e , in

your opinion, I-- I believe that's what
stated.
that

is that

you

In your opinion, he had slowed down; is

correct?
A

Yes .

Q

So what you did then was you pulled

along side of him.

And were you--

driver-- or your window--

up

Let's say your

front passenger

window

along side of his front window-Is that the idea?
with

So you were right

even

him?
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A

Yes.

Even.

Q

And how long would you say you were

A

Quite awhile.

like

that?
In fact, I did

it t w i c e .

I went up once and looked, and he wouldn't
And
there.

look.

I could see that there was a passenger

I backed back there, went back again.

I t h o u g h t , " Just look over so I can motion
you to slow down."

But he wouldn't

we probably did that.
don't know.

And
for

look over. So

It probably took u s - - O h , I

It was within a mile t h e r e .

Q

A mile?

A

Within a mile.

Q

So maybe about a m i n u t e , if you were

traveling

in

about 60

Somewhere

in there.

miles-an-hour?

A

Yeah.

Q

And his speed didn't vary during

period of time that you

that

noticed?

A

He was going

like 60 at that time.

Q

Did you honk or anything else to get

his

attention?
A

I don't recall

honking.

I do remember they were both-- it appeared
m e - - both consciously
Almost

trying not to look at m e .

like they were guilty.

So they were
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looking
Q
were

straight

ahead.

You felt they might be acting as if

they

guilty?
A

There's no doubt about

My feeling

is

they were just acting guilty. Otherwise the guy

in

the back would have still been
Q

asleep.

Officer, I have to ask you:

they acting
A

it.

like they were guilty

What

were

look

over.

of?

It was obvious they wouldn't

They didn't want to look over at m e .
Q

Did they act--

Does a drug

runner-

Does a person who's guilty of drug running act a
little different type of guilty than a person
who's guilty of just murdering

his wife or

just

speeding or something else, or do they all
guilty, in your
A

act

opinion?

W e l l , they act nervous.

These two were

obviously n e r v o u s , y e s , sir.
Q

Officer, have you ever stopped anybody

your entire life who wasn't nervous about
stopped by a police
A

Oh, yeah.

nervousness.

being

office?
They don't display

any

They could b e , but they don't

show

it .
Q

Do you notice any large amount of
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difference between people who a r e , q u o t e , guilty
of something, and those who aren't
of

in their

amount

nervousness?
A

Without

Q

And in your opinion, that is a good

to look

fail, y e s , sir.
thing

for as an estimate that they're guilty

of

something?
A

Probably the best o n e , y e s , sir.

Q

So when you stopped him-- you

pulled

behind him and stopped him-- it was because
looked guilty; is that

they

correct?

A

N o , sir.

Q

Why did you stop

A

For speeding.

them?

I couldn't even get

their

attention.
Q

Did you cite them

for

speeding?

A

I think they were issued a warning

c i t a t i o n , y e s , sir.
Q
shows

Do you have anything

in writing

that

that?
A

Y e s , I do.

Here it is right here.

Q

Did you find such a thing?

A

Yes .
MR. MCCULLOUGH:
THE WITNESS:

May

I approach?

Sure.
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Q

(BY MR. MCCULLOUGH)

But now, correct

me

if I'm wrong, Officer, if they had looked over at
y o u , you would have given them a hand signal
slow down, and that was it; is that
A

Q

correct?

That's probably what it would

amounted

to

have

to, y e s , sir.
Okay.

What would

it have taken-- guilty

a s i d e , what would

looks

it have taken, differently

what you saw, to stop him without any
about your stopping

from

hesitation

him?

In other w o r d s , you looked

for a reason

time not to stop him, but you didn't
apparently. What would

find

this

it,

it have taken, in your

opinion, to come up behind him and stop him
without
A

looking

for an

alternative?

If I had confirmed

have come up on the radar.
definitely
Q

it. That speed
It would have

But if, in fact, he had not

looked

than to tell him to slow down; is that
No.

were obviously
Q

been

a citation.

guilty, you would not have done anything

A

would

other

correct?

I couldn't get their attention.

They

not looking at m e .

Is that or is it not the indication
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you

just gave us of his looking guilty, O f f i c e r ,

the fact that he refused

to look at you?

A

He wouldn't

Q

Is that what you just identified

look of
A

look at m e .
as a

guilt?
Yeah.

But the question you asked me was

if he--if he would have looked guilty, would I
have let him go.
If he had
have motioned
Q

just simply
him down.

looked at m e , I would

He wouldn't do that.

But if he had looked at you with a guilty

look, you would have still stopped
not have stopped him if he'd
guilty
A

him?

You

would

looked at you with a

look?
N o , because

I would

have been able to

motion him to stop.
Q

So it was his lack of looking at you

made you stop him; is that

correct?

A

Yes .

Q

And you did that because the lack of

looking at you meant something
wise;

is that
A

that

to you

suspicion

correct?

That heightened my suspicion why

they'd

be so nervous not to look at m e , y e s .
Q

Did you have any particular
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that time that he may have been guilty of
particular thing; murdering

his w i f e , stealing

car, cheating at Las Vegas when he came
anything

in

some
the

through,

particular?

A

Yes.

Speeding.

Q

Speeding?

A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

But you didn't have enough evidence to do
anything more than give them a warning?
A

I wouldn't have done it, no.

Q

So when you stopped

intend

him, O f f i c e r , did

you

to just give him a warning and let him g o ,

or were you looking
A

I'd

for something

else?

have told them to slow down and

let

them go.
Q

What was it about his behavior or

either of their behavior or the situation
changed your mind
A

into a search

about
that

situation?

Several things.

First of a l l , the way Mr. Ziegleman's
were trembling; the fact that they couldn't
me any vehicle

information

other than

insurance card, and the fact that Mr.

hands
give

that
McNaughton

was as nervous as he w a s .
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Q

All right.

Is it unusual

Let's talk about the v e h i c l e .
for a person to be driving a

vehicle other than is in his own
A

name?

It's unusual-- not necessarily

them, but the passenger

driving

isn't one of t h e - - or the

owner isn't one of the p a s s e n g e r s , or something

of

that sort.
Q

Now, you say you've made 75 drug

out there in the last year or so. What
would you say were driving
A

percentage

somebody else's

Of those kind of drug a r r e s t s ,

drug arrests?

Probably

30.

40.

car?

felony

Probably-- what percentage

driving their own car or even had the

arrests

were

passenger?

30 may even be high. 30

percent.
Q

So the fact that they were

else's car heightened your
A

Yes .

Q

Did you know--

in

someone

suspicion?

They gave you the name of

an owner from an insurance paper; is that
A

Y e s , sir.

Q

And obviously you had access

license

correct?

to the

number.

Are you able to use that information
stolen vehicle report or

to get a

anything?
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A

Y e s , sir.

Q

And did you attempt to do so?

A

Oh, y e s , I would have, y e s .

Q

And what was the

A

It was negative.

Q

All right.

finding?

From your experience, Officer--

And

you've

been on the force about three y e a r s ; is that
right?
A

About

four years

Q

How long would

now.

it take someone--

say in Minnesota-- who had noticed

let's

his car was

missing to get it on to like an N.C.I.C. or an
interstate
A

situation so you could pick it up?

I don't know Minnesota's

California

laws.

it takes two days or something

like

that before they put it on.
Q

But if somebody goes out and simply

their car gone, it's
A

sees

quicker?

Yeah, if they don't have any

information

as to who would have stolen it.
Q
time

So in other w o r d s , it doesn't take a long

for a stolen vehicle report to come up to a

degree where you can pick it up on your m a c h i n e ;
is that correct?

Doesn't take long.
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days at the
A

outside?

If, in fact, it had been reported

in fact, the officer turned
Q

if,

it in.

Would you say, then, O f f i c e r , t h a t - -

indicated

the

stolen.

At what point did you form that
A

You

earlier that you had some suspicion

vehicle was

suspicion?

When he couldn't come up with any p a p e r s ,

being nervous

like he w a s , and that he offered a

name of William and Bill.
last name, as I recall.
of

and

But he didn't provide a
He provided me the

name

Bill.
Q

Did y o u - -

identification
A

He did show you

some

of owner?

Eventually he came up with what was

of an insurance application
Q

is a l l .

Were you ever able t o - - or did you

make

an attempt t o - - in later searching

or

contents of the vehicle-- find any

ownership

papers

kind

reviewing

in there?

A

N o , sir.

Q

Did you make any attempt

A

I don't recall actually

just to find the owner.
insurance

information.

to?
searching

But we did have
I think we called
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1

and confirmed

2

remember

3

Q

that he was a registered

right.
And you also called

4

to determine

5

reports on it; is that

6
7

A

o w n e r , if I

in right at the

if there were any stolen

vehicle

correct?

That would have been done eventually.

I

don't know at what point.

8

Q

9

radio?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And do you get the report back

12

scene

Are you able to do that from your

dispatcher or whatever

fairly

car

from

your

quickly?

13

A

Y e s , sir.

14

Q

And you probably would have done so then

15

at the scene; is that

16

A

17

scene.

18

Q

19

that

Yes.

correct?

It would have been done at the

And what was the result of that test

or

check?

20

A

That N.C.I.C. inquiry was

21

Q

Would

negative.

that be some indication

in your

22

mind, Officer, as to whether or not the

23

was

likely to be

vehicle

stolen?

24

A

Some, but not a hundred

percent.

25

Q

What would you typically do to double
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check on t h a t , if

anything?

A

Call the owner.

Q

Did you attempt to do that?

A

I believe

Q

And did you get any

A

I can't recall specifically

case.

I did at the office.

But I do it as a rule.

reply?
on

this

And if I did get a

reply, then the reply was that they did

have

permission to have it.
Q

Suppose, Officer-- once again, for the

sake of argument-- that you hadn't
in the car in your subsequent

found

search.

anything

Would

you

still have been suspicious despite the lack of
N.C.I.C. report, so on, enough to hold on to

these

people and take them down so you could phone

the

owner?
A

Typically

the dispatcher
Q

in that situation, I would

call the registered

owner.

Suppose you weren't able to get

at home.
A

somebody

And apparently you weren't able to.
Sometimes that happens.

You have to

weigh the totality of the circumstances

and see if

it's worth detaining them and how long it's
detaining
Q

have

worth

them.
And you would have had to make a decision
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at some point as to whether or not to let them
or to hold on to them

for further

go

investigation?

A

Right.

Q

However, what you did w a s - - because

of

the head m o v e m e n t s , and the hand m o v e m e n t s , and
the lack of vehicle identification, and so on, you
formed

suspicion that something

going on; is that correct?

else might

be

Is that a fair

assessment?
A

Something was going on.

That

something

was going on, y e s .
Q

So it was based on all of those

that you asked them for permission

things

to search

the

vehicle?
A

Y e s , sir.

Q

Anything else that I've

figured

in your reason

to search the

for asking

left out
for

that

permission

vehicle?

A

Not that I can r e c a l l , n o , sir.

Q

Officer, you were asked the question

direct examination

if they-- either of them had

any written permission

from the owner.

In all the cars you've stopped who
belonged

on

have

to somebody other than the person

car, have you ever seen anybody who does
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written

permission?

A

Yes •

Q

What kind of

A

Probably a smaller p e r c e n t a g e .

percentage?
Maybe 3 0 ,

40 percent,
Q

Have you ever borrowed

anybody's

car,

Officer?
A

Yes .

Q

Have you ever gotten written

A

N o , sir.

Q

Would

A

I've

permission?

it ever occur to you?
never traveled very

far in anyone

else's car•
Q
would

It wouldn't have occurred

to y o u , t h o u g h ,

it?
A

would

If I was going across the state, y e s , it
have. Not just in the city.

Q

Is that the reason it occurred

because of your police training

to y o u ,

or w h a t e v e r , or

because it would be easier or what?
A

Going out of

state?

Q

Yes .

A

For the same reason.

Q

At any rate, everything

that

happened

that we've gone through up until now made you
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decide that you wanted
that

to search the vehicle; is

correct?
A

Y e s , sir.

Q

So you asked

for permission, you got

from the driver, and you started

it

to look; is that

correct?
A

Yes •

Q

And now, you indicated

Ziegleman was

that had M r .

cooperative.

Did he act in any manner unusual to you
you asked him
A

for

permission?

Only that he was really polite.

seemed unusual.
demeaner.
Q

when

That

But that could be his own

Y e s , sir.

It was a little u n u s u a l .

What is the typical person who you

stop

and want to investigate do when you ask them a
question
A

like

that?

They're

" Help yourself."

like, " Sure.

Go ahead." O r ,

Or, " N o , sir. " " Y e s , sir. "

It's a little-Q

It's a little too

polite?

A

Yeah.

Q

And that affected you in some

A

Not really, no.

Q

Suppose, Officer, I were to tell you
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a person you were asking happened
who's a Deputy Sheriff.
s u p p o s e , have affected
Sheriff or a Highway
A

to have a mother

Would t h a t , do you
his politeness

to a Deputy

Patrolman?

I don't know whereas that would make

him

any more polite.
Q

Do you have a son, Officer?

A

N o , sir.

Q

How about the other sons of the

members on the force?
They probably

other

Are they polite to you?

like--

A

Friendly.

Q

They probably

A

Right.

Q

Unlike defense

like police.

attorneys.

Did his politeness make a difference
in level of suspicion or
A

to you

anything?

It could be an indicator, you

know.

Overly polite

is kind of a sign they may be as

nervous a s - -

W e l l , that could be his

demeaner.

own

I never really made a distinction

on

that.
Q

You indicated

that first he

fixedly at the car, and then turned.
indicated

stared
I think

as you got warmer or-- I believe
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quote i t.
" Usually when they look away like
you're

that

in a warm spot".

A

Yes .

Q

How usually? You say you've made 7 5 , 100

arrests of felony matters.
How usually out of those
A

Probably every time.

Q

Every

A

I would

75?

time?
say-- that may be high.

But

it

would be in the high 90's if it wasn't every time,
Q

So it's your experience that the

you get to stuff you start seeing necks
that

closer

jerk; is

right?
A

You see some obvious display

mannerisms

that would be different

of

than what

they

had been displaying up until that p o i n t .
Q

And the difference

in mannerisms

to you

was a turn of the head?
A

No.

Q

Physically

A

Yes.

Q

And

impression

They turned

around.

turned?

Looked away, y e s , sir.
in uniform--

I mean, I get

from your testimony

the

it was almost

they were lock stepped, that somebody
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about-faced
A

them.

I've

exactly

Is that--

seen that happen.

like that.

But this

isn't

They just turned

away.

Casually moved themselves and looked

away.

Q

Casual

A

They casually turned around.

were obviously
Q

gesture?
they

looking away, y e s .

Did you notice the height-- a heightened

amount of nervousness
you

But

or anything

like that

that

could-A

To that point it's almost an

indication

that they concede or something.
Q

That they concede

A

That we're going to find it.

Q

Did you know what you were

then,

what?

looking

for by

Officer?
A

By that time, we had come to the

conclusion

something was w r o n g , and whether or not

it was a stolen vehicle or it was a drug
Q
Deputy

courier.

When you say " w e " , you were with a
Sherrif; is that

right?

A

Y e s , sir.

Q

Did you have occasion to chat with

him,

caucus with him, anything, when you come up with
the

"we"?
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A

Yes •

Q

How did that

A

When we were searching

occur?
the car we made

the statement, " There has to be somebody
Look at the way they're acting."
of discussion.
that we'd

Just that

kind

Each time we'd

indicate that, "affirmative."

to be something
Q

Both of u s - -

here.

say

There

had

wrong.

Where were the defendants

you were making the

standing

while

search?

A

Between the cars.

Q

And officer-- was it Thompson?

A

Thompkins.

Q

Thompkins ?

A

Yes .

Q

He assisted you in looking

through

the

place?
A

Yes, he did.

Q

Neither of you were back at the back of

the car kind of keeping an eye on them or
anything?

I guess there was no place

go much, was

for them

there?

A

No, not

really.

Q

So he was up in the front of the car

assisting you ?
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A

We moved around.

I'd

be in the

front,

he'd be in the back.
Q

And where was he when you opened

trunk-- or the
A

hood?

I don't recall.

Oh.

When I was

the hood, he was up in the passenger
Q

the

Still looking

inside the

under

compartment

passenger

compartment?
A

Yes .

Q

Now, you testified

that-- and you

shown what was marked Exhibit N o . 2, which

were
are

some Zig Zag rolling papers. You said you

found

those in a shoe that you later identified

as

belonging

to Mr. Ziegleman.

A

Y e s , sir.

Q

You said that they were sometimes

for rolling

used

marijuana?

A

Y e s , sir.

Q

You didn't

A

N o , we didn't.

Q

They're also sometimes used, I a s s u m e ,

for rolling

find any

marijuana?

tobacco?

A

Y e s , sir.

Q

You didn't

A

No.

find any tobacco
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Q

Are you claiming

anything particular

for

the rolling p a p e r s , Officer? Are they evidence
anything

in your mind?

A

In my mind, y e s , sir, they are.

Q

Of what?

A

I couldn't understand why they

claim

of

wouldn't

them.
Q

And that, once again, added

suspicions; is that

to

correct?

A

Yes.

Suspicions, y e s .

Q

But that was well after you had

your search; is that

correct?

A

Shortly thereafter, y e s .

Q

Now, Officer, when you asked

you indicated

commenced

to search,

they were polite.

Did you in any manner
the defendants

indicate to either of

that they were

free to go as an

exception, like I can search this or you can go
and not let me search it?
any alternatives
alternatives

Or did you give

or any indication

of what

their

might be?

A

N o , sir.

Q

You didn't also indicate that they

under arrest or anything at the
A

them

were

time?

N o , sir.
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Q

But perhaps--

Would

it be fair to say

that the impression was given that they were
exactly

the

free to go at that

A

At what

Q

When you asked

not

point?

point?
for permission

to

search

vehicle?
A

Would

it be

fair?

Q

That you were giving out the

that they were not exactly

free to say

impression
" no"

and

go home?
A

I don't know how they perceived

Q

Suppose, Officer-- once again

that, no,

s ir .

sake of argument-- once again, you're

for the
still a

little suspicious that maybe the vehicle
stolen. Suppose they said, " N o . " Then
A

No to

Q

Yes .

A

Then

could

be

what?

search?

I'd

have gone back to my car, called

in N.C.I.C. information;
not it would be necessary

I'd

determine whether

to call the

or

registered

owner, and-Q

You would have had to make a decision

that point as to whether or not to hold on to
for further

at
them

information or to let them go; is that
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right?
A

Yes .

Q

You hadn't made that decision at that

time because

it wasn't necessary

to m a k e ; is that

fair?
A

Y e s , sir, that's probably

Q

When you found--

searched

fair.

First of a l l , you

the passenger compartment

first; is that

right?
A

Yes .

Q

And the trunk thereafter;

A

Y e s , sir.

Q

And you got permission--

permission

from Mr. Ziegleman

or duffle bag; is that

is that

right?

specific

to open his

suitcase

right?

A

Y e s , sir.

Q

And outside of rolling p a p e r s , found

nothing

in those areas, correct?

A

Right.

Q

Anything else in the car that we

talked about that affected
continued

in any manner

haven't
your

suspicions?

A

Nothing else other than rolling

Q

Okay.

Did the rolling p a p e r s , in fact,
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suspicion on possible marijuana
looking

that you might

for or —

A

Yes .

Q

When you found this item under the

did you find any information whatsoever

hood

under

hood that led you to believe that either of
specific defendants were in possession

the

the

of t h a t ,

other than the fact that they're all in the
car?

be

same

Anything under there that said to y o u ,

" A-ha.

This is Mr. Ziegleman's

drugs or this

is

Mr. McNaughton's drugs" or-A

Only what

I have indicated.

language. Not any hard
Q

Would

Body

evidence.

it be fair to say then, O f f i c e r ,

that the whole search was really as a result
body

of

language?
A

N o , not the whole search.

whole basis
Q

N o , sir.

The

for it was not just based on that.

W e l l , let's say this, Officer:

Suppose

the vehicle had been stolen. What evidence
you hope to find in the vehicle of its

could

being

stolen?
A

Personal property of the o w n e r s .

Q

Is there some type of personal

property

that an owner might leave in a vehicle that he had
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stolen rather than that he had let
borrow?

somebody

Some kind of idea as to maybe what

of personal property he might be looking
A

including
clothing.
good

for?

It's happened to me before where

owner left a bunch of personal property
some of his awards and some
Things

like that.

kind

the

and--

personal

That's usually a

indication.
Q

If you had found those items, it would

have heightened your suspicion of a stolen
vehicle?
A

Absolutely.

Q

You wouldn't

though, would

find those under the

you?

A

N o , sir.

Q

In fact, if you had been looking

evidence of a stolen vehicle
confined

hood,

it would have

to the passenger compartment

and

for
been
the

trunk?
A

Y e s , sir.

Q

And so by the time you opened the

you were not looking
vehicle; is that

hood

for evidence of a stolen

correct?

A

Right.

Q

You were looking specifically

for drugs?
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A

Y e s , sir.

Q

Particularly

for m a r i j u a n a , or had

you

decided?
A

No.

But based on the e v i d e n c e , it would

lead you to believe it could be m a r i j u a n a , y e s ,
sir.
Q

Let me just see if we can get this

down

to a few s e n t e n c e s , Officer.
The incident occurred b e c a u s e , number
you thought they were speeding
down; number two, they wouldn't

and they

slowed

look at y o u ;

number three, the vehicle belonged
that wasn't

one,

to

in the vehicle; and number

somebody
four, body

language .
Is that it in a n u t s h e l l , or is there
anything else that contributed

to the whole

incident and your behavior on that
A

incident?

You could probably put it in those

c a t e g o r i e s , sir.
MR. MCCULLOUGH:
THE COURT:
CROSS

Thank you.

Mr. Harmon?
EXAMINATION

BY MR. HARMON:
Q

Officer Bushnell, you have indicated

you had training on speed detection

at the

Lesley Nelson, C.S.R.
784 East Skylark Drive
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 (801)

that

police

798-2868
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

. „
.. ..! - *> •- -

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**********

pal P. Greenwood.Clerk .

S T A T E OF UTAH

Plaintiff,

Case Number:

vs.

RULING

BRENT ZIEGLEMAN AND MICHAEL
MCNAUGHTON

GEORGE

E.

82-E

BALLIF,

JUDGE

Defendants.
**********

This matter came before the Court on defendants' motions
to suppress cocaine, which was found in the hood of a car
defendants were driving.

Defendant Michael John McNaughton filed

his motion on August 26, 1991 and defendant Brent Ziegleman filed
his motion on September 6, 1991.
The Court, having proceeded with an evidentiary hearing and
also having considered the motions and memoranda, now enters its:
RULING.
The Court denies defendants' motions in that the officer
was justified in making the initial stop of the vehicle, he had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to detain defendants,
and he obtained a valid consent to search to vehicle.

In the event

that either the initial stop or subsequent detention are flawed,
then under a fourth amendment search and seizure analysis the issue
of standing and of a reasonable expectation of privacy would arise.
However, in this case defendants have not established that they had
such an expectation, especially in the hood area of the vehicle.
1.

Oep'Jty

2.
POINT ONE—THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN MAKING THE INITIAL STOP
The Utah courts have held that a police officer may stop
an automobile for a traffic violation committed in his presence,
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), and that an officer
conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license
and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a
citation.

State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990).

In

this case the officer, who was certified at estimating the speed of
vehicles, believed that there had been a speeding violation.

He

testified that he attempted to warn defendants of this, but because
they would not look at him, he pulled them over to relay this
warning.
It should be noted that if defendants' lack of eye contact was
the cause of the initial stop for speeding, it was only due to the
fact that the officer had been unable to warn defendant Ziegleman
about his excessive speed by giving hand signals.

This behavior

did not, in and of itself, lead the officer to believe that there
was more serious criminal activity going on. Although the officer
considers nervousness and shifty eye movements as evidencing guilt
in certain circumstances, those behaviorisms in the later part of
this investigation only served to reinforce other findings as the
investigation continued.
POINT TWO—THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED
SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL STOP

IN

DETAINING

DEFENDANTS

In Robinson, the Utah Appellate Court held that once an
officer has obtained a valid driver's license and evidence of

$7

3.
entitlement to use the vehicle, the driver must be allowed to
proceed on his way.

Here the driver, Brent Ziegleman, could not

produce a registration for the vehicle, and the only entitlement
to use the car was his claim that his friend "Bill" had loaned him
the car.

He could provide no further information about "Bill."

In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) it was stated
that an officer may seize or detain a person if the officer has an
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about
to commit a crime.

Here, the officer has testified that he

suspected that the car had been stolen. Therefore, he detained the
defendants in order that he could check with NCIC to see if the
car had been stolen.
POINT THREE—THE OFFICER OBTAINED A VALID CONSENT TO SEARCH THE
VEHICLE
It is unclear from the facts whether the officer asked for
consent to search the car while he was waiting for the results from
NCIC, or whether he had already learned the car was not listed as
stolen when he asked for consent.

In any event, it is undisputed

that Ziegleman replied, unhesitatingly, "help yourself."

This

seems to be voluntary consent and, in fact defendants have not
alleged any police coercion or duress, but claim the search is
invalid under a "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis.

However,

the initial stop was valid, the subsequent detention was valid,
and the contraband was discovered under the hood of the car
pursuant to a valid consent to a search, and thus it is admissible.

c

/c>

4.
POINT FOUR—DEFENDANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO OBJECT TO A SEARCH OF
THE HOOD AREA
The foregoing analysis assumes that defendants had standing to
object to the search, pursuant to a fourth amendment search and
seizure analysis. However, in the event that the initial stop, the
subsequent detention or the search were flawed in some manner, the
issue does arise whether defendants had standing, or had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hood area, to begin with.
According to Utah case law, the legitimate expectation of
privacy test is a fact sensitive and not a bright line test.
v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1989).

State

In State v. Taylor, 169

Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah App. September 12, 1991), it was held that
a defendant can have a legitimate expectation of privacy if he is
the owner or is in possession of the property with the permission
of the owner, and that "in order to be sufficient for fourth
amendment purposes, a subjective expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."
In this case, defendants admitted they were not the owners of
the vehicle, could produce no registration for it, and could not
produce evidence that permission had been given to them by the true
owner to use the car.

All they could say is that "Bill", about

whom they could give no details, had loaned them the car.

The only

circumstance implying permissive use of the car was that they were
in possession of the car.

This is not sufficient to establish a

reasonable expectation of privacy.
Furthermore, even if defendants had such an expectation in the

<?/

5.
passenger compartment of the vehicle, they most likely did not have
a subjective expectation of privacy in the area under the hood of
the vehicle.

Pursuant to Taylor, this is certainly not an

expectation that society would recognize as reasonable, when they
were not the owners of the vehicle and have not established that
they had the permission of the true owner to use the vehicle.
Dated at Provo, Utah this

\ H day of January, 1992.

BY THE COURT

cc:

Donald J. Eyre, Jr.
W. Andrew McCullough

1
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4
5
6
7
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W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170)
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS
Attorneys for Defendant Ziegleman
930 South State Street, Suite 10
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 224-2119
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF JUAB COUNTY

9

STATE OF UTAH

10
11

-—oooOooo
STATE OF UTAH,

12

OBJECTIONS TO FORM OF
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,

13

vs.

14

BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and MICHAEL
MCNAUGHTON,

Case No. 82-E

15
Defendants.

16
oooOooo

17
COMES NOW Defendant Brent Ziegleman and objects to the form of

18
Plaintiff's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on

19
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, as follows:

20
1.

Defendant Ziegleman has no objection to Paragraph 1.

2.

At the end of Paragraph 2, a comma should be inserted

21
22
after the word "speeding" and the following phrase should be added:

23
"and

investigating

suspicious

behavior

of

the

occupants,

in

24
refusing to look at him."

25
3.

Defendant Ziegleman has no objection to Paragraph 3.

4.

After the first sentence of Paragraph 4, should be added

26
27
28
IcCullough, Jones,
& Ivins
330 Soutn State St

vr>

1
2
3
4
the following phrase: "the driver was, however, able to produce an
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

insurance paper indicating the name of the owner, William Kaylor."
The following additional sentence should be inserted "It is not
unusual to travel in a borrowed car without carrying written
permission."
5.
follows:

The second sentence of Paragraph 5 should be rewritten as
"The request came back negative, but the officer

continued to investigate the situation, because of the nervousness
of the occupants, and his general feeling of suspicion raised by
the circumstances."
6.

Defendant Ziegleman has no objection to Paragraph 6.

7.

Defendant Ziegleman has no objection to Paragraph 7.

8.

Defendant Ziegleman has no objection to Paragraph 8.

Defendant Ziegleman has the following objections to the
Conclusions of Law set forth by Plaintiff:
1.

A comma should be inserted after the word "estimate" in

Paragraph 1, and the following phrase should be added:
refusal of the occupants to make eye contact with him".
2.

A comma should be inserted after the word "vehicle" and

the following phrase should be inserted: "and upon the nervousness
and 'suspicious' behavior of the occupants."
3.

Defendant Ziegleman has no objection to Paragraphs 3, 4

and 5 of Plaintiff proposed Conclusions of Law.

27
28
cCuilough Jones,
& Ivins
>30 South State St
Su.te 10

"and the

/ ,

1

2
3
4

•

DATED t h i s

*

day of April, 1992.

5
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS

6

C/(2tLs ft.

7
8

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Defendant Zieglem

9
10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

11
I hereby certify that on the

day of April, 1992, I did

12
mail a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Objections,

13
postage prepaid to Donald Eyre, Attorney for Plaintiff, 125 North

14
Main Street, Nephi, Utah 84648 and Milton T. Harmon, Attorney for

15
Defendant McNaughton, 36 South Main Street, Nephi, Utah 84648.

16
17

IIKL aw IS

18
zieglexian.obj

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Duliough, Jones,
& Ivins
0 South State St

£f

?! DJutrlci Couti, Ju-t, C-unt

Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84 648
Telephone: 623-1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:
Criminal No. 82-E

BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and
MICHAEL McNAUGHTON,

:

Defendants.

:

The above entitled matter came before the Court for hearing
upon the defendant's Motion to Suppress on November 15, 1991.

The

defendant, Brent Ziegleman, was present and represented by his
attorney,

W.

Andrew

McCullough,

and

the

defendant,

Michael

McNaughton, was present and represented by his attorney, Milton T.
Harmon.

The State of Utah was represented by Donald J. Eyre Jr.,

Juab County Attorney.
The Court having heard the evidence introduced by both the
State of Utah and the defendants and having reviewed the Memorandum
of Law submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the
premises and the Court having previously entered its Ruling dated
1

January 14, 1992, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On July 20, 1991 on 1-15 within Juab County, Utah, Trooper
Lance Bushnell, a four year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol,
observed

a motor vehicle

in the area of Nephi, and

visually

estimated the speed to be in excess of 70 m.p.h., approximately 75
m.p.h., but was unable to obtain a radar reading on the vehicle.
The officer had received training and certification in estimating
of speeds.
2.

The officer turned and followed the vehicle to obtain a

paced speed, but the vehicle had slowed and was now traveling 60
m.p.h..

He then pulled alongside the vehicle with the intent of

giving the driver a hand signal to slow down.

Neither the driver

nor the passenger would look towards him so he could signal them
to slow down. The officer then stopped the vehicle with the intent
of giving the driver a warning concerning his speeding.
3.

The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, Brent Lee

Ziegleman, with one other passenger in the vehicle, the defendant,
Michael McNaughton.
4.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer approached the

driver and asked for a driverfs license and registration.

The

driver produced a driver's license, but was unable to produce a
registration.

The driver claimed the owner's name was "Bill" and
2

he was a friend and he had borrowed the car, but could give no
further information concerning liis name or where he lived.
the

driver

searched

for

the

registration,

extremely nervous with the hands trembling.

he

appeared

While
to

be

The occupants had no

written authorization or anything that gave them the right to be
in possession of the vehicle.
5.

The officer ran the vehicle through the NCIC computer to

determine

if

it was reported

stolen.

The request

came back

negative, but the officer continued to investigate the possibility
of a stolen vehicle, because of his past experience of finding
stolen vehicles not listed on NCIC as stolen.
6.

The officer then asked the driver if there were any

weapons, drugs or narcotics in the vehicle.
was not any.

The driver said there

The officer then asked for consent to search, Mr.

Ziegleman unhesitatingly replied "help yourself".
7.

The officer then searched the interior of the vehicle and

found nothing of substance.

The officer then asked for consent to

search the trunk, which consent was again given by the driver.
Again no contraband was found therein. The officer then search the
hood area.

Between the right front fender and the battery was an

oil cloth covering a brown grocery sack with a kilogram of cocaine
contained therein.
8.

Both defendants were then arrested for possessing cocaine
3

with the intent to distribute•
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The stop of the defendants' vehicle by Trooper Bushnell

for speeding based upon his visual estimate was lawful based upon
reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law.
2.

The continued detention of the defendants after the

initial stop for speeding, was justified based upon the defendants
inability

to produce

a registration

for the vehicle

or any

authority to be in possession of the vehicle.
3.

The defendant, Ziegleman, voluntarily consented to a

search of the vehicle by the officer without any coercion or duress
by the officer.
4. Neither defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
to the hood area of the subject vehicle, and therefore did not have
standing to object to a search of that area of the vehicle.
5.

Both defendants1 Motions to Suppress should be denied.

Dated this

I

r

c*. DLtrlct Court, Jjaii Cr»m*/

F I L£ P
Mot/ ^
M

rj. C. **» occ»\..r\ _ — i :r:_.y

Donald J. Eyie UJL., H U . XU^.X
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: 623-1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,
VS.
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and
MICHAEL McNAUGHTON,
Defendants.

:
:

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS1
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS

:

Criminal No. 82-E

:

The above entitled matter having come before the Court upon
both defendants1 Motions to Suppress for hearing on November 15,
1991 before the Honorable George E. Ballif, sitting
thereof.
represented

The
by

defendant,
his

Brent

attorney,

W.

Ziegleman,
Andrew

was

as Judge

present

McCullough,

and

and
the

defendant, Michael McNaughton, was present and represented by his
attorney, Milton T. Harmon.

The State of Utah was represented by

Donald J. Eyre Jr., Juab County Attorney.
The Court having previously entered its Ruling dated January
14, 1992, and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants'
1

/CO

Motions to Suppress are denied.
Dated t h i s

day of

llA^ArJ?

, 1992.
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JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**********

STATE OF UTAH,
Case Number:

Plaintiff,

82-E

RULING

vs.

GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and
MICHAEL McNAUGHTON,
Defendant,
**********

The Court has considered the objections of the
defendants7 to the State's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law
and said obejctions are overruled and the State's Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law are ordered filed herein.
Dated this

/J

day of May, 1992.
BY THE COURT

GEORGE W. BALLIF, JUDGE

cc:

Donald Eyre
Milton Harmon
W. Andrew McCullough
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